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FOR LOVE OR MONEY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
CONTRACTUAL REGULATION OF
REPRODUCTIVE SURROGACY
Abigail Lauren Perdue, J.D.
I. INTRODUCTION
On March 27, 1986, Baby M entered the world.' She was the intended
child of a surrogacy arrangement in which her gestational and genetic
mother, Mary Beth Whitehead, agreed to be artificially inseminated with
donor semen from the intended father, William Stem, because his wife,
Elizabeth Stem, was infertile. The parties executed a surrogacy contract,
which entitled Whitehead to a $10,000 fee. After Baby M's birth, however,
Whitehead sued for custody of Baby M, and although the Court invalidated
the surrogacy contract because it found "the payment of money to a
'surrogate' illegal, perhaps criminal, and potentially degrading to women," it
applied a family law framework to award Mr. Stem custody, giving
Whitehead only visitation rights.2
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1. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1249 (N.J. 1988), remanded to 542 A.2d 52
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1988); George H. Colt, Baby Craving: Science and Surrogacy:
Searching for a Biological Child on the High-Tech Frontier, LIFE, June, 1987, at 42;
Robert Hanley, Beyond the Court Fight: Deep Love for Baby M, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18,
1987, at 30.
2. In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 411 (1988).
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The subject of a bizarre New Jersey custody battle that would raise
significant questions about reproductive surrogacy, Baby M became the
poster child for all that is awful and wonderful about assisted reproduction.
Without it, Baby M would not have been born, but because of it, her life
would never be the same. A novelty and a legend, Baby M became the test
case in the still unresolved debate regarding the legal and ethical
implications of reproductive surrogacy.
At the heart of this debate lies the question of whether the American legal
system should permit reproductive surrogacy, and if so, how reproductive
surrogacy should be regulated. This Article explores that question by
discussing the advantages and disadvantages inherent in the contractual
regulation of reproductive surrogacy. Contract law provides a plethora of
legal protections, making it the dominant mechanism by which Americans
regulate important transactions. From the marriage contract to the last will
and testament, if a transaction is considered valuable, we generally get it in
writing. Why should a surrogacy arrangement be any different? As such,
this Article explains the surrogacy process and explores various problems
inherent in its contractual regulation as well as ways to address those
problems. 3
II. SURROGACY: WHAT IS REPRODUCTIVE SURROGACY?
Reproductive surrogacy occurs when a woman known as a "surrogate"
carries a child for someone else that she will relinquish upon delivery. In
traditional surrogacy, the surrogate's egg is artificially inseminated with the
intended father's sperm, making him the child's biological and intended
father.4 By contrast, a gestational surrogate carries a child conceived from
donated gametes implanted in the surrogate via in vitro fertilization (IVF).
In the alternative, a surrogate could be implanted with gametes donated by
one or both of the intended parents or gametes from anonymous donors,
such that the child is not biologically related to the intended parents or the
surrogate.s
3. The recommendations in this Article are made only to the extent permissible by
applicable law and regulation and not necessarily with regard to extralegal implications.
4. The "intended father" refers to the male who intends to raise the child. "Intended
mother" refers to the female who plans to raise the child. Depending on the type of
surrogacy, the intended parents may also be the biological parents if they have donated
eggs or sperm for implantation into the surrogate.
5. But see N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:17 (2011) (requiring that the intended
mother or intended father provide a gamete to be used to impregnate the surrogate and
that the intended mother or surrogate provide the ovum).
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Although reproductive surrogacy is becoming more common, the practice
is still relatively new. By 1986, only an estimated 600 documented
reproductive surrogacy arrangements had occurred in the United States.6
Between 1977 and 1992, an estimated 5,000 surrogate births had taken place
in the United States. By 2008, the number of surrogate births had
skyrocketed to approximately 28,000.
Reproductive surrogacy involves a complex medical process. The egg
donor takes a fertility drug for seven to ten days to stimulate egg
production.9  Blood tests are administered to record the egg donor's relevant
hormone levels, and when her ovarian follicles have properly matured, she
receives a final human chorionic gonadotropin shot.10 Approximately thirty-
six hours later, she ovulates, and a physician retrieves her eggs.]1
Between several hours to one day later, the eggs are removed, examined
for maturity, and placed in a Petri dish with donor sperm to facilitate
fertilization. Approximately twelve hours after fertilization, the embryo
divides into two cells; forty-four to seventy-two hours later, it will become
13an eight-cell embryo that is implanted into the surrogate's uterus. It is not
uncommon to transfer several embryos during an embryo transfer cycle or to
6. Iver Peterson, Surrogate Mothers Vent Feelings ofDoubt and Joy, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 2, 1987, at BI.
7. Shelley Levitt and Lorenzo Bennet, Surrogacy Under Siege, PEOPLE, Sept. 28,
1992, at 71.
8. New York Times Magazine Examines Infertility, Surrogacy, MEDICALNEWS
TODAY.COM (Dec. 2, 2008), http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/131464.php.
9. Andrew W. Vorzimer, et al., Guide To Infertility Options Through Assisted
Reproductive Technologies, ORG. OF PARENTS THROUGH SURROGACY, http://www.opts.




13. A less common fertilization technique known as gamete intrafallopian transfer
(GIFT) involves injecting a mixture of eggs and sperm directly into the surrogate's
fallopian tube and allowing implantation to occur as it would naturally. Physicians also
occasionally recommend zygote intrafallopian transfer (ZIFT), which entails removing
eggs via aspiration, allowing fertilization to occur in a laboratory, and then implanting the
zygote into the surrogate's fallopian tube. Id.
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opt to freeze excess embryos in case the first implantation attempt or
pregnancy fails. 14  Where the surrogate is also the egg donor, artificial
insemination, or the transfer of sperm directly into the surrogate's
reproductive tract, is often utilized.15 Prior to insemination, the donor semen
is tested for sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) to prevent the transmission
of infection.16
After implantation, the surrogate may be asked to reduce multiple
pregnancies by aborting one or more fetuses due to abnormalities or because
of the many risks inherent in such pregnancies.' 7 Despite the risks, live birth
rates of approximately thirty-four to thirty-nine percent per surrogate have
been achieved, which is equivalent to or better than the living birth rate of
IVF. Higher success rates for pregnancies involving reproductive surrogacy
were reported as compared to those involving IVF when an intended mother,
who had undergone a hysterectomy, used a surrogate. 8
Although scant empirical research on the impact of surrogacy exists,
reproductive surrogacy does not appear to be associated with more negative
outcomes than traditional births. One study comparing the outcome of
pregnancies resulting from gestational surrogacy with those resulting from
standard IVF found that the incidence of low birth weight and prematurity
did not significantly differ for single-baby pregnancies.19  Pregnancy-
induced hypertension and bleeding in the third trimester of pregnancy was
significantly lower for pre nancies resulting from gestational surrogacy as
opposed to standard IVF. No increased incidence of abnormalities in
children bom of reproductive surrogacy has been found.21 Because the
existing research regarding reproductive surrogacy indicates that it is a
relatively safe and effective method of procreation, the primary objections





18. P.R. Brinsden, Gestational Surrogacy, 9 HuM. REPROD. UPDATE 483, 486 (2003).
19. Judy Parkinson et al., Perinatal Outcome After In- Vitro Fertilization-Surrogacy,
14 HUM. REPROD. 671, 673 (1998).
20. Id.
21. Brinsden, supra note 18, at 487.
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III. REGULATING SURROGACY: SHOULD REPRODUCTWE SURROGACY BE
REGULATED?
Given that reproductive surrogacy appears to be a safe and effective
procreation alternative that is increasingly utilized, a pressing need for its
regulation exists. In the absence of legislative or contractual regulation, the
parties to a surrogacy agreement could easily take advantage of one another,
and no existing legal recourse would punish or prevent such abuses. The
conflict underlying Johnson v. Calvert explains why such protections are
necessary.22
In 1989, Anna Johnson volunteered to be a surrogate for a co-worker,
Crispina Calvert, after learning that Crispina was infertile due to a
23hysterectomy undergone to remove uterine tumors. Anna allegedly
assured Crispina's husband, Mark, that she had been approved as a
surrogate, and Anna was unrepresented when the parties executed the
surrogacy contract on January 15, 1990.24 Four days later, an embryo
created from Mark's sperm and Crispina's eg was successfully implanted
in Anna, but her pregnancy was difficult. She was hospitalized for
excessive vomiting and dehydration and experienced premature labor.26
The physical complications of the pregnancy were exacerbated by the
growing tension between Anna and the Calverts. The Calverts felt deceived
because Anna had not disclosed her past miscarriages and stillbirths.27 Anna
became angry because the Calverts did not obtain an insurance policy for
28her. She sent them a letter demanding that they pay her rent and have her
phone reconnected or risk forfeiting the baby.29 Her demand letter stated in
pertinent part:
22. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993).
23. Id. at 778.
24. JULIE TATE, SURROGACY: WHAT PROGRESS SINCE HAGAR, BILHAH, AND ZILPAH!
34 (Am. Bar Ass'n, 1995).
25. Id.
26. Id.
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I don't think you'd want your child jeopardized by living out on the
street. I am asking you for help in paying off the final five thousand.
There's only two months left & once the baby is born, my hands are
free of this deal. But see, this situation can go two ways. One, you
can pay me the entire sum early so I won't have to live in the streets,
or two you can forget about helping me, but calling it a breach of
contract & not get the baby! I don't want it to get this nasty . . . The
next letter you receive will be from my lawyers, unless I hear from
you by return mail at the end of next week.30
Ultimately, the Calverts sued, and Johnson countersued. The baby was
born in the midst of the litigation, and DNA tests proved it was the Calverts'
biological child. The Calverts prevailed because the court "analogized
Anna's relationship with the child to that of a foster mother, whose liberty
interest, if any, in her relationship with the foster child is surely more
attenuated than that of the natural parents with the child." 3 1 Distinguishing
surrogacy from baby-selling, the court asserted that it was permissible for
Anna to collect a $10,000 fee for the pain and suffering of childbearing and
delivery.3 2
On appeal, the reviewing tribunal avoided the issue of the contract's
enforceability and instead looked to the Uniform Parentage Act for
guidance, finding the blood test determination of Crispina's maternity to be
dispositive.33  As the appellate court explained, "[i]n light of Anna's
stipulation that Crispina is genetically related to the child and because of the
blood tests excluding [Johnson] from being the natural mother, there is no
reason not to uphold the trial court's determination that Crispina is the
natural mother." 4 According to the appellate court, no court had ruled that
a gestational surrogate has a constitutionally protected right to a relationship
with a child to whom she is not biologically related.35
Calvert illustrates that gestational surrogacy poses fewer legal risks
because the surrogate has no genetic tie to the child and consequently is less
30. TATE, supra note 24, at 35.
31. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 786 n.13 (Cal. 1993).
32. Id. at 784.
33. Id. at 779-80.
34. Anna J. v. Mark C., 286 Cal. Rptr. 369, 376 (Cal. App. 1991).
35. Id. at 371.
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likely to be granted custody if she revokes her consent. It is also
conceivable that, because the surrogate is not the child's biological mother,
she may be less likely to form a maternal bond with the baby during
pregnancy, perhaps reducing the risk of revocation. For the same reason, the
surrogate's partner and existing children may also be less prone to feel an
emotional tie to the child and are more apt to encourage the surrogate to
relinquish the child. As such, a surrogacy contract is more likely to be
enforced if a biological link to the intended parent(s) exists. At least one
state, New Hampshire, requires such a link. This will also circumvent the
application of baby-selling laws since a parent cannot "buy" what is already
his, his biological child. However, the existence of a genetic link, or the
lack thereof, should not be determinative, as this would effectively outlaw
arrangements in which both intended parents are infertile and use
anonymously donated gametes.38
Calvert also demonstrates the importance of regulating reproductive
surrogacy to prevent extortion. One can easily imagine a slightly different
scenario in which a surrogate shows ultrasound pictures of the child to the
excited intended parents and then demands that they pay off her credit card
bills or else. The intended parents might meet virtually any of the
surrogate's demands, no matter how egregious, to prevent harm to or loss of
their child.
In addition to the type of extortion evinced by Anna Johnson's demand
letter, absent overarching legal protections, brokers could also take
advantage of intended parents and surrogates by charging exorbitant fees.3 9
Baby M's intended parents purportedly paid their surrogacy broker $7,500 to
arrange the "agreement;" the surrogate earned only $10,000.40 Yet, in the
36. Under Virginia law, for instance, when a child is born pursuant to a surrogacy
contract not approved by a court, the gestational mother is the child's mother unless the
intended mother is also the genetic parent, in which case the intended mother is the
mother for legal purposes. If either of the intended parents is a genetic parent of the
resulting child, then the intended father is the child's father. However, if the surrogate is
married, her husband is a party to the contract, and they exercise their right to retain
custody, then they are the parents. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158 (2011).
37. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:17 (2011) ("The intended mother or the intended
father shall provide a gamete to be used to impregnate the surrogate.").
38. But see id.
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absence of statutory or contractual regulation of reproductive surrogacy, or
some combination thereof, surrogates and intended parents have limited, if
any, legal recourse against dishonest or unethical surrogacy brokers.
IV. PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN DRAFTING AND ENFORCING
SURROGACY CONTRACTS
Although contractual regulation of reproductive surrogacy is workable,
albeit complicated and problematic, drafting enforceable surrogacy contracts
is no simple task given their unique and sensitive subject matter. It is
unclear which standard of performance applies to a surrogacy contract to
determine whether it has been breached. Furthermore, the contract's
enforceability could be challenged because, inter alia, the agreement is
unconscionable, illegal, or void against public policy.4 1
A. Selecting a Standard of Performance
Selecting which standard of performance applies in order to analyze
whether a breach has occurred is a threshold issue that must be addressed
when determining whether a surrogacy contract is enforceable. Selection of
this standard hinges upon whether reproductive surrogacy is considered a
sale or service, or some combination of the two.
If a surrogacy agreement is considered a contract for a sale, the perfect
tender principle will apply, permitting a buyer to reject a good and refuse to
42pay for it due to any defect, no matter how minor. However, if
reproductive surrogacy is considered a service, substantial performance
governs and permits a party to withhold payment only if a defect in
performance materially impairs the essence of the bargain. Substantial
performance is especially useful as a check against the opportunistic practice
of "fly-specking," in which idiosyncratic bargainers contract for a service
and just before its completion, refuse to pay because of a slight
imperfection.43
Characterization of the surrogacy contract also impacts its legality and
thus, enforceability. Because baby-selling is prohibited, characterizing a
41. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 25-218(A) (2011) ("No person may enter into,
induce, arrange, procure or otherwise assist in the formation of a surrogate parentage
contract.").
42. U.C.C. § 2-601 (2005).
43. See generally ROBERT E. SCOTT & JODY S. KRAus, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY
67-76 (Matthew Bender, 3d. ed. 2002); Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239 (1921)
(discussing the idiosyncratic bargainer).
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surrogacy agreement as a contract for the sale or purchase of a child would
render the agreement illegal and unenforceable. Although framing the
agreement as one for gestational services might clear that hurdle, a contract
that requires performance of an illegal act is void." As such, whether the
agreement is for a sale or a service, it will be illegal and unenforceable if it
runs afoul of existing law.
Taking these competing considerations into account, surrogacy contracts
are more properly considered service contracts. Characterizing them as sales
contracts hints of baby-selling and treating children as commodities. It also
implies that a child bome of surrogacy could be lawfully rejected for any
trivial defect, such as an unattractive birth mark, although court adjudication
might prevent this result.
Substantial performance is the more suitable standard because it could
reduce the likelihood of idiosyncratic intended parents rejecting the child for
immaterial defects, such as eye color. A breach would occur only if a party
impaired the essence of the bargain by, for example, aborting the fetus or
refusing to relinquish the child. However, because neither standard of
performance is ideal, courts and legislatures should consider fashioning an
entirely new standard of performance, modeled on substantial performance
but tailored to specifically address issues unique to reproductive surrogacy.
B. Fashioning an Adequate Remedy
Fashioning an adequate remedy for breach of a surrogacy contract is
equally, if not more, challenging than selecting the proper standard of
performance. Specific performance is the appropriate remedy for a unique
good for which no equivalent could be substituted through reasonable
means.45 However, specific performance is never ordered as a remedy in
service contracts because doing so violates, inter alia, the constitutional
prohibition of involuntary servitude.46
44. ISS Int'l. Serv. Sys. v. Widmer, 589 S.E.2d 820, 825 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003)
(restating the general rule "where an agreement consists of a single promise, based on a
single consideration, if either is illegal, the whole contract is void"); see generally Taylor
v. Fields, 178 Cal App.3d 653 (1986) (stating that offering sex for money constitutes
illegal consideration that would render a contract unenforceable); Greil Bros. Co. v.
McLain, 197 Ala. 136, 140 (1916) ("Executory contracts ... founded on ... illegal
consideration, are void and unenforceable.").
45. TATE, supra note 24; see also Robin Fox, Babies for Sale, 111 NAT'L AFFAIRS
114-40 (1993).
46. See generally U.S. CONST., amend. XXIII; Woolley v. Embassy Suites, Inc., 227
Cal. App. 3d 1520, 1533 (1st Dist. 1991) ("[I]t is a fundamental rule that specific
performance cannot be decreed to enforce a contract for personal services, regardless of
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Setting aside these constitutional concerns, specific performance is also
unsuitable because it requires the relinquishment of a child absent an
evaluation of the child's and other parties' best interests. The child is
unique, but classifying her as a "good" treats her as a commodity and hints
of baby-selling. However, forcing the surrogate to relinquish the child to the
intended parents might be suitable if a court determines that relinquishment
is in the child's best interests.
As an alternative to specific performance, expectancy, restitution or
reliance damages could be imposed to protect parties' respective interests. 4 7
Expectancy damages are based upon a party's expectation interest, including
the loss of value resulting from the other party's non-performance or any
48other incidental or consequential losses. If a promise conditioned on an
event, such as delivery, is breached, and it is uncertain whether the event
would have occurred in the absence of the breach, the injured party may
recover damages based on the value of the conditional right as of the
breach.49  However, to recover one must prove the amount lost."o
Expectancy damages are typically not awarded if they are too speculative
and cannot be proven to a reasonable certainty.51 The calculation of such
damages is problematic in the context of reproductive surrogacy because it is
difficult, if not impossible, to prove the measure of the loss one incurs when
forced to relinquish a child. How does one adequately measure the value of
the anticipation of intended parents anxiously awaiting the birth of their
child or the heartbreak of a surrogate forced to relinquish a child with whom
she has unintentionally bonded? As such, an award of expectancy damages
is likely unsuitable in the context of reproductive surrogacy.
Restitution, or the return of expenses paid to the surrogate as of the date of
the breach, might be the most suitable remedy for breach of a surrogacy
contract and the easiest to calculate. A court could order a breaching
surrogate to reimburse the intended parent(s) for various expenses, such as
the cost of maternity clothing and medical expenses. Likewise, the intended
which party seeks enforcement . .. [because doing so] would run contrary to the
Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition against involuntary servitude.").
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parent(s) could request reliance damages from the surrogate resulting from
expenses incurred in reasonable reliance on her promise to relinquish the
child, such as the cost of constructing a nursery or the purchase of baby
clothes. Although courts will continue to struggle in fashioning proper
remedies for breaches of surrogacy contracts, a well-drafted surrogacy
contract might ease that burden by outlining the damages that the parties
agree should result from a breach.
In reality, no remedy could fully compensate for the emotional,
psychological, and financial damages incurred when a surrogacy
arrangement goes awry, but some remedy for breach is necessary to provide
an incentive for the parties to fulfill their contractual obligations. Although
money damages are inadequate to soothe the heartache of the disappointed
intended parent(s) or remorseful surrogate, an imperfect remedy is better
than no remedy at all.
C. Consideration
The fact that money is exchanged for a child, or at least for the child's
gestation, is one of the most controversial aspects of reproductive surrogacy.
However, in order for a surrogacy contract to be enforceable, valuable
consideration must be exchanged. As such, one must determine what
constitutes proper consideration in the unique context of surrogacy without
running afoul of law, ethics, and public policy.
The payment of a surrogate's reasonable medical expenses should
constitute sufficient valuable consideration to render a surrogacy agreement
enforceable. Not only would payment of such fees be less likely to run afoul
of existing law, but also the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
in every contract, which requires each party to enable the other party to
perform, justifies payment of the surrogate's reasonable medical expenses
because it enables her to undergo the medical treatment necessary to uphold
her end of the deal - delivering a baby - which she might otherwise be
unable to afford.54
Facilitation and encouragement of good prenatal care is also consistent
with public policy. Permitting payment of a surrogate's reasonable medical
expenses advances the best interests of the child, the intended parent(s), and
52. § 71.
53. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2121 (2011) (permitting payment of, inter alia,
the birth mother's and intended child's actual medical expenses attributable to pregnancy
and birth, and the birth mother's reasonable living expenses during or as a result of the
pregnancy).
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979).
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society by ensuring good prenatal care and possibly discouraging the
intended parent(s) from demanding that the surrogate undergo unnecessary
but expensive or painful medical tests and procedures. On the other hand,
the surrogate has a disincentive to seek frivolous tests, even if she does not
pay for them, because such tests and procedures are often time-consuming
and painful. Imposing the onerous financial burden of such testing on the
surrogate might cause her to refuse to undergo pertinent tests, such as
amniocentesis, which detects treatable conditions; such a refusal contravenes
the child's best interests. For example, the contract at issue in Baby M
required the surrogate to undergo amniocentesis "or similar tests" to detect
genetic and congenital defects. Aside from the promise of payment, the
possibility that the surrogate may keep the child also incentivizes her receipt
and practice of proper prenatal care.
In the alternative, a surrogacy contract could permit minimal
compensation above and be ond reasonable medical expenses, unless
otherwise prohibited by law. 6 By way of illustration, throughout the
pregnancy, the surrogate could also receive a reasonable allowance for
maternity clothes, prenatal vitamins, and reasonable pregnancy-related
items. For all expenses, documentary written evidence, such as receipts of
purchase, should be provided. If permissible, such surrogacy payments
should be held in an escrow account until the relinquishment of the child to
the intended parent(s). In contemplating the reasonableness of such fees, the
parties could take into account foreseeable risks and complications of
pregnancy, including death, aneurism, hypertension, vaginal scarring, stretch
marks, etc., and the approximately 6,480 hours of "labor" the surrogacy
contract may entail.
Compensation may also alleviate paternalistic concerns that reproductive
surrogacy necessitates the exploitation of women. Perhaps surrogacy bears
no more risk of exploitation than other money-making means, such as exotic
55. These tests can detect, inter alia, certain birth defects and fetal abnormalities.
56. Michigan's Surrogate Parenting Act defines "compensation" as "a payment of
money, objects, services, or anything else having monetary value except payment of
expenses incurred as a result of the pregnancy and the actual medical expenses of a
surrogate mother or surrogate carrier." MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.853 (2011) (emphasis
added); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 20-156 (2011). This statute defines "reasonable
medical and ancillary costs" as:
[T~he costs of the performance of assisted conception, the costs of prenatal
maternal health care, the costs of maternal and child health care for a reasonable
post partum period, the reasonable costs for medications and maternity clothes,
and any additional and reasonable costs for housing and other living expenses
attributable to the pregnancy.
Id.
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dancing, posing for pornographic magazines, donating gametes, or serving
as a telephone sex operator, and legislatures should focus on ensuring that
surrogates are properly paid rather than prohibiting reproductive surrogacy
altogether. Though some women choose to become surrogates out of dire
financial need rather than completely free choice, denying women the
opportunity to choose for themselves may be a greater evil than providing
them with contractual and statutory protection once the choice to serve as a
surrogate has been made.
On the other hand, providing valuable consideration in addition to
reasonable medical expenses may make a surrogacy contract more
susceptible to claims that it is an illegal and unenforceable baby-brokering
contract. It is well settled that an illegal contract is unenforceable.57 State
laws prohibit baby-brokering, i.e., the exchange of valuable consideration
for adoption.58 Similar concerns underlie baby-brokering and reproductive
surrogacy, and surrogacy has been described as baby-selling in disguise.
However, because legislatures typically did not contemplate reproductive
surrogacy when drafting and enacting baby-brokering statutes, such laws are
not intended to govern surrogacy. It is improper to flex such laws beyond
their intended scope.
Compensation raises another pertinent consideration regarding whether
the parties' relationship is tainted by duress and unequal bargaining power.
Such concerns are important because "if a party's manifestation of assent is
induced by an improper threat by the other party that leaves the victim no
reasonable alternative, the contract is voidable by the victim."5 Unequal
bargaining power and duress are also likely to trigger allegations of
procedural unconscionability on the grounds that the surrogate did not freely
57. See supra note 44.
58. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-1OA-23 (2011) ("No person, organization, group,
agency or any legal entity may accept any fee whatsoever for bringing the adopting
parent or parents together with the adoptee or the natural parents."); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT.
525 / 1 (2011) ("No person and no agency, association, corporation, institution, society,
or other organization, except a child welfare agency . .. shall request, receive or accept
any compensation or thing of value, directly or indirectly, for providing adoption services
..... ); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2121 (2011) ("Except as otherwise authorized by law, no
person shall request, receive, give or offer to give any consideration in connection with
an adoption, or a placement for adoption . . . ."); IOWA CODE § 710.11 (2010) ("A person
commits a class 'C' felony when the person purchases or sells or attempts to purchase or
sell an individual to another person. This section does not apply to a surrogate mother
arrangement.").
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 (1979).
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enter into the contractual relationship. Unequal bargaining power and
financially-induced duress are significant issues because the surrogate is
often of lower socioeconomic status than the intended parent(s). For
instance, Baby M's surrogate mother was a high school dropout who held
numerous low-paying part-time jobs. Financial problems plagued her
family, and they eventually lost their home. 61  By contrast, Baby M's
intended parents held doctorate degrees and enjoyed a combined total
income of $89,500 per year.62
Munoz v. Haro hiPhlights the dangers of unequal bargaining power in the
surrogacy context. 6 There, Alejandra Munoz discovered that her cousin,
Nattie, had manipulated her into serving as a surrogate.64 Munoz was an
illegal immigrant who left her job as a bank sanitation worker in Mexico to
come to America, bringing along the illegitimate child she had had as a
65teenager. But unlike Nattie, whose tubal ligation rendered her infertile,
Munoz was a young and healthy woman who spoke no English.66 In
exchange for assistance in crossing the border, Munoz agreed to conceive
and gestate a baby that Nattie and her husband, Mario, would raise.67
Munoz later contended that she agreed only to be inseminated with Mario's
semen, carry the embryo for a few weeks, and then implant it in Nattie.6 A
month into the pregnancy, Munoz allegedly asked Nattie when they planned
to implant the baby into her, and onl then did Nattie explain that Munoz
would have to carry the baby to term.
60. Baby M: Traditional Surrogacy Gone Wrong, INFORMATION ON SURROGACY,
available at http://www.information-on-surrogacy.com/baby-m.html (last visited Apr. 25,
2011).
61. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1249 (N.J. 1988).
62. Id.
63. TATE, supra note 24, at 22, 24; see also Munoz v. Haro, No. 572834 (San Diego
Super. Ct. 1983).
64. TATE, supra note 24, at 22, 24.
65. Id. at 21.
66. Id. at 20-21.
67. Id. at 21-22.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 22.
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With family present and purportedly pressuring her and already one
month pregnant with the child, Munoz signed the agreement given to her by
Nattie even though she had no representation present. 70 Munoz then used
Nattie's name to receive prenatal care and to enter the hospital.71 Even then,
Munoz thought that she would get the baby in the end because in her own
words, "mothers always get the babies." 72  When Munoz entered the
hospital, staff purportedly demanded that she sign a paper, which
unbeknownst to her, was a birth certificate. Because she had signed Nattie's
name, Nattie was able to take the baby home from the hospital.73  She
refused to let Munoz see the child, at which time Munoz sought legal
counsel and sued.74
The court relied on the constitutional right to procreate embedded in the
right to privacy to declare the surrogate parenting contract not void and
claim that people have a "constitutional right to enter into such contracts."75
However, as in Baby M, the court focused on family law, not contractual,
issues.76 The Haros ultimately retained custody, but Munoz received
visitation. 77
Because payment of significant expenses or fees can be potentially
coercive, a woman's decision to serve as a surrogate made while she is in
dire financial straits might make the surrogacy contract more susceptible to
allegations of undue influence. Money could be used as leverage to prevent
the surrogate from revoking her consent, especially if the surrogate had
spent part of their fee or indebted herself to others in anticipation of
receiving it. Because it may be difficult, if not impossible, to return the
monies paid, the surrogate might have no choice but to relinquish the child,
even if she no longer wants to do so. Were the surrogate to breach the
70. TATE, supra note 24, at 22.
71. Id. at 22-23.
72. Id. at 23.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 24.
76. TATE, supra note 24, at 24; see also In re Baby M., 525 A.2d 1128, 1167 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987).
77. TATE, supra note 24, at 25.
2011 293
The Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy Vol. XXVII:2
contract, a court could order pecuniary damages; as such, a surrogate might
be forced to surrender the child because she cannot afford to pay the
damages. Although this application of a contractual framework regulates the
revocation of consent and provides added security for the intended parent(s),
it can constitute economic coercion of the surrogate who consents not out of
volition, but because her potential indebtedness gives her no other choice.
Of course, this illustration is less applicable to situations in which the
surrogate and the intended parent(s) are of equal socioeconomic status, but
those situations are uncommon and typically involve intra-familial or
otherwise purely altruistic surrogacy.
D. Substantive Unconscionability
Surrogacy contracts are also susceptible to challenges of substantive
unconscionability. If a contractual term is substantively unconscionable at
the time of contract formation, a court can refuse to enforce the entire
contract, only enforce portions of the contract not deemed unconscionable,
or limit application of the contract so as to avoid an unconscionable result.78
The surrogacy agreement at issue in Baby M illustrates the risk of
substantive unconscionability posed by carelessly drafted surrogacy
contracts. The surrogacy agreement at issue in Baby M stated in pertinent
part:
Surrogate . . . understands and agrees that in the best interest of the
child, she will not form or attempt to form a parent-child relationship
with any child or children she may conceive, carry to term and give
birth to, pursuant to the provisions of this Agreement, and shall freely
surrender custody to .. . Natural Father, immediately upon the birth of
the child; and terminate all parental rights to said child pursuant to
this agreement.79
No surrogate can realistically promise not to form a bond with the child
she bears; it is likely beyond her control. Because this provision demanded
the surrogate perform a task for which she could not reasonably guarantee
performance, an argument exists that the clause was substantively
unconscionable. Surrogacy contracts should be carefully drafted to avoid
such substantive unconscionability.
78. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1979).
79. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1249 (N.J. 1988) (citing the surrogate parenting
agreement) (emphasis added).
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E. Procedural Unconscionability and Informed Consent
Surrogacy contracts are also often attacked on grounds of procedural
unconscionability because, inter alia, to be fully enforceable, each party
must give his or her voluntary, informed consent. As such, parties entering
surrogacy agreements should fully disclose and exchange relevant
information prior to conception and contract execution.
1. Mandatory Evaluations and Full Disclosure ofRelevant
Information
Baby M demonstrates the importance of full disclosure. There, the
intended parents knew little about the surrogate's past. Sources later
alleged that the surrogate had worked as a go-go dancer, domestic abuse
tainted her marriage, and her husband had a history of alcoholism and drunk
driving. 8 The agency that paired Baby M's intended parents with her
surrogate also failed to disclose the surrogate's psychiatric evaluation to the
intended parents despite the psychiatrist's concern that the surrogate might
82be unwilling to relinquish the child. Specifically, the psychiatrist noted:
[The surrogate] is sincere in her plan to become a surrogate mother
and [ ] she has thought extensively about the plan. However, I do
have some concern about her tendency to deny feelings and think it
would be important to explore with her in somewhat more depth
whether she will be able to relinquish the child in the end.83
Had full disclosure of the evaluation and the surrogate's history been
required before entering the agreement, the affected parties may have made
a more informed and perhaps better choice.
As such, parties affected by a surrogacy agreement, including the intended
parent(s), the surrogate, and her partner, should be required to undergo
background checks, psychiatric evaluations, and home studies prior to
conception and contract execution, and the results should be provided to
parties upon request. The agency or broker facilitating the surrogacy
arrangement should be required to confidentially maintain these results for at
least ten years after the date of contract execution.84 This requirement serves




84. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-4-106 (2010) ("All papers and records
pertaining to the assisted reproduction, whether part of the permanent record of a court or
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the child's best interests because the agency or broker should, to the extent
permissible by law, reject a potential surrogate or intended parent deemed
mentally unstable, providing screening similar to that performed by an
adoption agency. In addition, the evaluation could prevent a situation akin
to Baby M's by excluding surrogates who show a high probability of
revoking their consent or lapsing into a serious post-relinquishment
depression. The surrogate may decide that she does not want to bear a child
for a man whom a psychiatrist has found to have abusive tendencies. The
intended parent(s) could avoid selecting a surrogate with a high likelihood of
revoking her consent.
2. Mandatory STD Testing and Disclosure ofResults
To prevent the spread of infectious diseases and related but preventable
birth defects, the surrogacy agreement should also require gamete donors
and the surrogate to undergo physical and gynecological exams before
contract execution and conception. Gamete donors and the surrogate
should be tested for sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) and HIV/AIDS
prior to contract execution and again before insemination and pregnancy, in
case a party has contracted an STD in the interim. To prevent the spread of
STDs and the transmission of birth defects or other health complications to
the child, STD carriers and individuals with AIDS or HIV should not be
permitted to serve as surrogates or gamete donors.86
3. Post-Birth Revocation Period and Birth Certificate
In order to avoid the claim that a surrogate's pre-birth waiver of consent is
not dispositive because it was not fully informed, some states require a post-
delivery grace period during which the gestational mother can consent again
in writing and/or her consent is presumed if she does not revoke her earlier
consent. As such, a surrogacy contract may not fully satisfy the criterion of
of a file held by the supervising physician or advanced practice nurse or elsewhere, are
subject to inspection only upon an order of the court for good cause shown.").
85. See generally AM. CONG. OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTs, GONORRHEA,
CHLAMYDIA, AND SYPHILIS (Jan. 2011), available at http://www.acog.org/publications/
patient-education/bp07 1.cfm (explaining that gonorrhea, chlamydia, and syphilis can be
passed from mother to baby and can cause, inter alia, a miscarriage, eye infection or
blindness, birth defects, pneumonia, and death.) [hereinafter GONORRHEA]; see also N.H.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:17 (2011) (requiring that the intended mother or intended
father provide a gamete to be used to impregnate the surrogate and that the intended
mother or surrogate provide the ovum).
86. GONORRHEA, supra note 85; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B: 17.
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informed consent unless it allows for a post-delivery grace period for
revocation because the surrogate's agreement to relinquish her parental
rights upon delivery constitutes a pre-birth waiver of consent, which is void
in some states. Where pre-birth waivers of consent are unenforceable, a
surrogacy agreement should provide for a forty-eight hour post-delivery
grace period for revocation of consent. This provision will enable the
intended parent(s) to have the security of knowing that after a requisite
period of time, their legal rights to the child are cemented.
The grace period for revocation should be short enough to prevent trauma
to the child from bonding for a lengthy period of time with one party, only to
be separated from them when the surrogate later revokes her consent. Yet
the grace period should be sufficient to provide the surrogate ample time to
recover her capacity to consent after delivery and to make an informed,
voluntary decision to go through with the agreement. For example, in RR v.
MI, a surrogate changed her mind in the sixth month of pregnancy, and a
Massachusetts court rejected the contract on public policy grounds, pointing
to her pre-birth consent and the payment of a fee by the intended parents as
the basis for its decision.88  The court indicated that, had no compensation
beyond pregnancy related expenses been paid and if the surrogate had been
bound only by a post-birth consent, then the agreement may have been
enforceable. 89 In A.H. W. v. G.H.B., a court voided a pre-birth termination of
the surrogate's parental rights, as requested by the surrogate, but the
biological, intended parents' names could go on the birth certificate after a
seventy-two hour waiting period.90
Unfortunately, requiring a grace period of revocation and a post-delivery
waiver of consent could increase the intended parents' insecurity because
they will not know whether the surrogate will relinquish the child. Yet they,
too, could give their informed consent to the arrangement by having the
surrogate's rights, including her right to revoke her consent during the grace
period, adequately explained to them by an attorney before executing a
surrogacy agreement. This notice might allow the intended parents to
maintain disconnectedness from the pregnancy until delivery, perhaps
87. Compare IND. CODE ANN. § 31-19-9-2 (LexisNexis 2011) (stating that consent to
adoption may be executed at any time after the birth of the child and prohibiting pre-birth
consent to adoption), with Code of Ala. § 26-1 OA- 12 (2011) (permitting pre-birth
consent if signed and confirmed before a judge of probate).
88. RR v. MH, 689 N.E.2d 790, 791 (Mass. 1998).
89. Id. at 797.
90. A.H.W. v. G.H.B., 772 A.2d 948, 954 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000).
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mitigating the heartache and disappointment they might endure if the
surrogate revoked her consent.
A related concern is the emotional and psychological impact on a
surrogate caused by relinquishing a child. In the surrogate's anxious post-
relinquishment state of mind, she might lack the necessary mental capacity
to make an enforceable post-delivery decision to terminate her parental
rights. As such, although a post-birth ratification procedure after the end of
a grace period for revocation may be necessary to satisfy the informed
consent requirement and make the surrogacy contract enforceable, such
requirements will not entirely resolve whether the consent was given entirely
free of coercion or duress.
Despite the forty-eight hour period revocation grace period, the child's
birth certificate should reflect, either at the outset or at the conclusion of the
forty-eight hour period, that the intended parent(s) are the child's legal
parent(s), and the child should be released into their custody forty-eight
hours after delivery. Otherwise, the surrogate could obtain access to the
child.91 If the surrogate is permitted to take the child home during the forty-
eight hour grace period for revocation because she is the parent listed on the
birth certificate, then she may be more likely to revoke her consent due to
the bonding that could occur in the interim as occurred in Baby M. Baby
M's birth certificate listed the surrogate as Baby M's mother, so the hospital
released Baby M to the surrogate and her husband.92 The couple became
attached to Baby M and ultimately, refused to relinquish her.93
4. Selecting a Surrogate
To better ensure that the surrogate is capable of giving her informed
consent, select a surrogate who is at least twenty-one years of age and who
91. See, e.g., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 5-C:29 (2011) (stating that if the surrogate is
married, a three party affidavit of paternity must be prepared showing the natural father
as the child's father, but if she is not married, the birth certificate will only how the
natural father as the child's father after an affidavit of paternity has been executed); VA.
CODE ANN. § 20-158 (2011) (explaining that generally, "[t]he husband of the gestational
mother of a child is the child's father, notwithstanding any declaration of invalidity or
annulment of the marriage obtained after the performance of assisted conception, unless
he commences an action in which the mother and child are parties within two years after
he discovers or, in the exercise of due diligence, reasonably should have discovered the
child's birth and in which it is determined that he did not consent to the performance of
assisted conception.").
92. In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 414 (1988).
93. Id.
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has already bome and/or relinquished a child because this may make the
contract less susceptible to informed consent challenges since it better
guarantees that the surrogate is more aware of the sacrifice she is making,
the potential of gestational bonding, the feelings of guilt, depression, and
anxiety that may accompany the loss of a child, and the other psychological
and emotional upheavals that she could experience as a result of the
arrangement. 94
For similar reasons, choose a surrogate who is married with children or
who has experienced a pre nancy or adoption to the extent doing so does not
run afoul of existing law. This aims to better ensure that surrogates are
informed of the emotional pain of giving up a child, but it is unlikely to
decrease the number of women currently interested in becoming surrogates.
A married surrogate has a partner and perhaps existing children to offset the
potential emotional loss caused by relinquishing a child, which may reduce
the risk that she will revoke her consent or suffer adverse emotional
consequences following relinquishment of the child. She is also likelier to
have financial support, so she may be less susceptible to financial coercion.
This reasoning is persuasive but not foolproof. After all, while a surrogate
might know what it was like to give up a particular child or to experience a
particular pregnancy, she has no idea what it will be like to give up a
different child or to experience another pregnancy under distinguishable
circumstances. No matter a surrogate's experience or wisdom, nothing can
adequately inform her about what to expect, except the pregnancy and birth.
Depending on one's definition of "informed consent," an argument exists
that only after delivery a surrogate can give her informed consent.
5. Mandatory Counseling
Another pertinent issue is lack of informed consent by participants who,
absent statutory or contractual mandates, may have no legal recourse if they
do not receive adequate counseling on reproductive surrogacy or accurate
and sufficient background information on each participant. The potentially
tremendous impact of reproductive surrogacy on all affected parties supports
the notion that they be required to receive counseling before and after the
birth. This lack of preparedness could increase their susceptibility to
emotional and legal issues resulting from foreseeable but unanticipated
94. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:17 (2011) (requiring all parties to a surrogacy
contract to be at least twenty-one years of age and stating that "[n]o woman may be a
surrogate, unless she has a documented history of at least one pregnancy and viable
delivery.").
95. Perhaps for similar reasons, Virginia requires the intended parents to be a
married husband and wife. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-156 (2011).
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complications, including the divorce of the intended parents, multiple births,
who retains physical custody of the intended child during the pendency of a
contractual dispute and in the absence of a court order, an abnormal fetus, a
surrogate's spontaneous abortion, or revocation of consent. 96 The absence
of legal protections may also exacerbate the parties' anxiety as to whether,
inter alia, the surrogate will follow the physician's recommendations during
the pregnancy or revoke her consent.
Counseling should also be required for all affected parties before signing
the contract, before conception, during the pregnancy, and for one year after
delivery. "Affected parties" include the intended parent(s), the surrogate,
and if they exist, the surrogate's partner, and the existing children of the
intended parent(s) and/or the surrogate. Affected parties should see a
counselor to obtain advice about surrogacy. Topics to be discussed with the
intended parent(s) should include but are not limited to: alternative treatment
options, including adoption or being childless; the full cost of treatment;
practical difficulties of gestational surrogacy, including failed attempts and
legal uncertainty; medical, psychological, and emotional risks, both long and
short-term, to the intended parent(s), the surrogate, her partner and children,
and the intended child; the implications of multiple pregnancies and
selective abortion; the risks and implications of having a miscarriage,
stillbirth, or a child with birth defects, abnormalities, or disabilities; the
degree of involvement the surrogate may wish to have with the child; the
legal risks of revocation of consent; social stigma; and the means to be used
to inform child about its origin. Similarly, topics to be discussed with the
surrogate should include but not be limited to: all of the aforementioned
issues discussed with the intended parent(s); implications of IVF and
delivery, including a Caesarian section; potential feelings of guilt,
bereavement, jealousy, and depression at giving up the child; the effect on
96. See, e.g., 2011 N.M. ADV. LEGIS. SERV. 124 (contemplating the impact of divorce
and death in the surrogacy context); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.861 (2011) (stating that if
a contractual dispute arises, the party having physical custody of the intended child at the
onset of the dispute may retain physical custody until a court orders otherwise).
Any child resulting from insemination of a wife's ovum using her husband's
sperm, with his consent, is the child of the husband and wife notwithstanding
that either party filed for a divorce or annulment during the ten-month period
immediately preceding the birth. Any person who is a party to an action for
divorce or annulment commenced by filing before in utero implantation of an
embryo resulting from the union of his sperm or her ovum with another gamete,
whether or not the other gamete is that of the person's spouse, is not the parent
of any resulting child unless (i) implantation occurs before notice of the filing
can reasonably be communicated to the physician performing the procedure or
(ii) the person consents in writing to be a parent, whether the writing was
executed before or after the implantation.
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158 (2011).
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the surrogate's existing children and how she will explain the arrangement to
them; the full measure of the expenses that she will be able to receive under
law; and her relevant constitutional rights, including her right to abort.
Once the counseling sessions are completed, the parties' combined
medical and counseling report must be reviewed by an ethics committee or
other relevant oversight body at the surrogacy center or medical facility
performing the procedure, to the extent one is available. This reviewing
body should make recommendations regarding whether the arrangement
should proceed, which should generally be followed by the clinic, broker,
and parties.97
The surrogate's partner and existing children should also undergo
counseling since unfortunately, their interests and emotions are often
overlooked and deemphasized. The partner is effectively condoning or
facilitating his or her partner's participation in what some might call
conceptual adultery, which could compromise the relationship. The
partner's loved ones know that the surrogate is carrying another person's
child, and it is not unreasonable to assume that, as with ordinary adultery,
that situation might be emotionally difficult. During the pregnancy, the
surrogate's partner might also unintentionally bond with the child, making
him or her hesitant to relinquish the child.
Reproductive surrogacy could also adversely impact the surrogate's
existing children. Anecdotal evidence supports this conclusion. For
example, Baby M's surrogate mother had two existing children, both of
whom allegedly became attached to Baby M and were upset when their
98
visitation rights with her ended. If courts and legislatures grapple with the
complexities of reproductive surrogacy, imagine the confusion and turmoil
the practice would have upon a child who sees her perceived sibling given
away to pay off the mortgage, buy a new car, or perhaps worse, enroll her in
private school.
In considering the scope of informed consent, the interests of the
surrogate's partner, to the extent one exists, warrant at least some
consideration. If the surrogate is married, her partner must typically sign a
non-consent form, depending on applicable state law;99 otherwise, the
97. See infra Section III.
98. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1258-59 (N.J. 1988).
99. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-17-201 (2011); ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 25-218(C) (2011)
("If the mother of a child born as a result of a surrogate contract is married, her husband
is presumed to be the legal father of the child. This presumption is rebuttable."); CAL.
FAM. CODE § 7450 (2011) (stating that a child born to woman cohabiting with her
husband, who is not impotent or sterile, is conclusively presumed to be a child of the
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partner may be presumed to be the child's natural parent, vesting the partner
with financial responsibilities to the child and requiring the partner to
terminate his or her parental rights before adoption of the intended child can
proceed. In Baby M, for instance, the surrogate's husband signed a
surrogate parenting agreement so that the intended father would be deemed
Baby M's natural father and the surrogate's husband would not be
responsible for child support. 00
For this reason, surrogacy contracts should require the surrogate's partner,
if one exists, to sign a "Refusal to Consent" form prior to conception and
again, if necessary, upon delivery. The surrogate's marriage, civil union, or
registered domestic partnership during pregnancy or after delivery should
not affect the contract or court order's validity, and the partner should not be
deemed a party to the contract. Signing this form will rebut applicable
statutory presumptions so that the intended parents may avoid lengthy,
expensive adoption proceedings to establish parentage and to gain or retain
custody of the intended child.
6. Independent Representation
Before executing a surrogacy agreement, parties should be strongly
encouraged to retain independent legal counsel. The surrogacy agency
should provide independent legal counsel to an indigent surrogate. In all
other circumstances, independent counsel for both parties is strongly
recommended. A rebuttable presumption against the enforcement of
surrogacy contracts created when only one of the parties had independent
counsel may exist. Where language barriers exist, a translator should be
provided to the non-English speaking party.
In re Adoption of Matthew B illustrates the significance of independent
representation. There, Nancy B. became a surrogate to enjoy a positive birth
experience absent the ensuing responsibility of raising a child as a single
mother. 01 The surrogacy broker hired an independent attorney to explain
the surrogacy contract to Nancy, and she reviewed the agreement with the
marriage); CAL. FAM CODE § 7611 (2011) (listing the criteria for establish a presumption
of paternity); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106 (2010). The Colorado statute states that:
If, under the supervision of a licensed physician or advanced practice nurse and
with the consent of her husband, a wife consents to assisted reproduction with
sperm donated by a man not her husband, the husband is treated in law as if he
were the natural father of a child thereby conceived.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106 (2010).
100. BabyM,537A.2dat 1265.
101. In re Matthew B., 232 Cal. App. 3d 1239 (1991).
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attorney in a three and a half hour meeting during which he made contract
additions in Nancy's interest. 102 However, Nancy later claimed that she had
not given her informed consent because she had no idea what she would be
sacrificing. 103  She stayed silent during the eight months between the
contract signing and the conception, and after Matthew was born, she signed
the release form for adoption.104 The intended parents filed the requisite
documents for proof of paternity and stepparent adoption and maintained a
positive relationship with Nancy; Nancy even threw the intended mother a
birthday party, giving her the original copy of the signed consent form as a
present.
However, only months after the adoption, Nancy appeared on television
and in the newspaper, announcing her intent to seek custody of Matthew. 1 06
She sued to withdraw her consent and to vacate the judgment of paternity,
but both motions were denied. 107 The court rejected her claim that she did
not know her rights by pointing to her long meeting with independent
counsel, the explicit language in her contract, and her conduct during and
after the birth, which provided clear evidence that she did understand the
consequences of signing the consent form.10  The court also rejected
Nancy's argument that the contract was illegal primarily because she had
failed to make it in the original pleading. 109  The court further noted that
even if the contract was illegal, the parties had assumed the risk that it might
be unenforceable.' 10 As the court explained:
[E]ven if Nancy were in a position to raise the issue, and even were
we to find the contract illegal, we would not automatically void the
consent. The effect of illegality on a transaction depends on the facts
102. Id. at 1252.
103. Id. at 1255-56.
104. Id at 1252.
105. Id. at 1252-53.
106. Id. at 1251.
107. In re Matthew B., 232 Cal. App. 3d 1239, 1251 (1991).
108. Id. at 1260.
109. Id. at 1255.
110. Id.at1256.
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and equities of the particular case . . . including 'the kind and degree
of illegality involved, the public policy or policies to be served,
whether those public policies will best be served by enforcing the
agreement or denying enforcement and the relative culpability and
equities of the parties' . . . . Accordingly, even if were to assume that
the parties' conduct was illegal, the state's paramount interest in
Matthew's welfare overrides its interest in 'deterring illegal
conduct.' 1
Requiring each party to have independent counsel present at the contract
negotiation and signing may unduly burden the parties, especially the
surrogate who is often of lower socioeconomic status than the intended
parent(s). However, some attorneys might provide such representation on a
pro bono basis. Infertility centers with sufficient financial means should
provide free legal counsel to indigent surrogates in the event that they are
unable to provide an attorney. This would not only protect parties' interests
but also could decrease the success of surrogates' claims of coercion, duress,
undue influence, and unequal bargaining power. Instead, each party would
have equal representation and could voice his or her concerns about the
contract. Further, counsel for the surrogate could reduce the danger that the
counsel for the affluent party will manipulate the presumptively less
sophisticated surrogate; the surrogate's attorney could also advise her to sign
or to negotiate for different contractual terms.
7. Foreseeable Consequences
To better ensure that the parties have given their informed consent, the
surrogacy agreement should contemplate the vast array of foreseeable
conseouences that could result. In re Marriage of Moschetta demonstrates
why. In 1989 Elvira Jordan was inseminated with Robert Moschetta's
sperm to conceive a child for him and his wife, Cynthia, but during the
second trimester, Robert asked Cynthia for a divorce. 113 The Moschettas
never told Elvira of their marital difficulties until after their daughter was
born.114 When Elvira learned of the Moschettas' impending divorce, she
refused to relinquish her parental rights; she had not contracted to bear a
child for a divorcing, dysfunctional couple." 5 Elvira only allowed the
111. Id.
112. In re Marriage of Moschetta, 25 Cal. App. 1218 (1994).
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Moschettas to take the child home if they agreed to stay together, which they
did."'6 Six months later, however, Robert took the child and left Cynthia.'1 7
A nasty custody battle ensued, in which a court held that Cynthia had no
cognizable custody claim to the child because she was neither her biological
nor gestational mother.118 Moschetta undermined the importance of the
intended mother and raised the question of whether the potential divorce
should have been disclosed to Elvira during the first trimester so she could
have chosen to abort the pregnancy or revoke her consent." 9
McDonald v. McDonald provides another poignant illustration of the
impact of divorce in the context of assisted reproduction.120 There, an ex-
husband claimed that he was the only natural parent of children borne of his
sperm and a donated egg, which were implanted and carried to term by his
ex-wife.121 The court declared the wife to be the natural mother of the
children and allowed her to sue for custody.122 In re Marriage Buzzanca v.
Buzzanca involves a couple procreating via reproductive surrogacy who
separated during the pregnancy.123  After their divorce, the husband
disclaimed responsibility for the child, refusing to pay child support.' 24 The
surrogate did not want the child, but the court rejected the notion that the
baby had no legal parents.125 Rather, it ruled that the intended parents were
the legal parents responsible for the child's care and support and forced the
116. Id.
117. Id
118. In re Marriage of Moschetta, 25 Cal. App. 1218, 1224 (1994).
119. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. 19-4-106 (7) (a) (2010) ("If a marriage is dissolved
before placement of eggs, sperm, or embryos, the former spouse is not a parent of the
resulting child unless the former spouse consented in a record that if assisted
reproduction were to occur after a dissolution of marriage, the former spouse would be a
parent of the child.").
120. McDonald v. McDonald, 196 A.D. 2d 7 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 12.
123. In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 61 Cal. App. 1410 (1998).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1425.
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ex-husband to pay child support because he was analogous to a man who
consents to his wife's artificial insemination and is therefore, presumed to be
the baby's father.126 In Soos v. Superior Court, the court rejected an
intended father's allegation that his wife had custody rights to children borne
of eggs she donated to the surrogate.127 The court declared a state law,
which provided that the surrogate is the child's legal mother, to be
unconstitutional on equal protection grounds as applied to a biological
mother.128
Case law provides no clear answer as to who retains custody of the
intended child in the event of a party's separation or divorce during the
pregnancy or after the birth. This lack of legal clarity makes it all the more
important that these issues be discussed before conception or the execution
of a contract by the parties to the surrogacy, and to the extent possible,
reflected therein.
For the same reasons, the surrogacy contract should also anticipate
multiple births and selective reduction. Fertility drugs, which are
administered to egg donors to stimulate egg production, substantially
increase the likelihood of multiple pregnancies. As such, couples utilizing
assisted reproduction are commonly faced with the choice to selectively
abort one or more fetuses due to abnormalities or because multiple
pregnancies pose many associated risks. Furthermore, in some situations,
parties to a surrogacy agreement are faced with a difficult situation when the
intended parents contract for one child, but the surrogate becomes pregnant
with multiple children whom the intended parents do not want. Selective
abortion also raises the question of whether aborted or extra embryos should
be donated to research.
Likewise, the surrogacy agreement should anticipate miscarriage(s) and/or
stillbirth(s). Miscarriages and stillbirths are not uncommon, often due to no
fault of the gestational mother. As such, it seems unfair to penalize the
surrogate for a miscarriage or stillbirth absent proof that her high-risk
behavior caused the event. Such a clause is ill-advised because it increases
the likelihood that the contract will be construed as violating baby-selling
statutes and treating children as commodities. One solution is to pay the
surrogate a pro rata apportionment of her fees for services rendered based
on the duration of the pregnancy. For example, if her entire fee is $9,000,
and she miscarries in the second month, she would receive $2,000. This
could undercut a claim that the surrogacy contract is for a sale, not
126. Id. at 1426-27.
127. Soos v. Superior Court, 897 P.2d 1356 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994).
128. Id. at 1360.
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gestational services. By contrast, providing that no compensation be paid if
the surrogate miscarries suggests that payment is for the baby, not the
gestational services rendered.
The surrogacy contract should similarly contemplate the consequences of
fetal abnormalities. Given recent advances in genetic technology, parents
increasingly test fetuses for genetic abnormalities. A surrogacy agreement
should address the issue of whether the intended parents will request the
surrogate to undergo any genetic testing as well as what action the couple
will take in the event the child is diagnosed with a genetic abnormality. The
contract at issue in Baby M left unanswered questions that have become
pertinent in subsequent surrogacy cases, such as who bears legal
responsibility for a child born with genetic or birth defects. Are the intended
parents liable for the child's care even if they did not contribute the bad
genes or because the birth defects result from the surrogate's improper
prenatal care, such as drinking or smoking during the pregnancy?
A comprehensive surrogacy agreement should address such issues as
Stiver v. Parker demonstrates. In 1983, Judy Stiver agreed to serve as a
surrogate for the Malahoffs, but when she gave birth to a mentally
handicapped infant boy, neither she nor the intended couple wanted the
child. Blood tests established that Stiver's husband was the child's father,
yet the Malahoffs sued the Stivers for not maintaining abstinence during the
attempted insemination period as required. 130 The Stivers sued their doctor,
lawyer, and psychiatrist for not advising them about the timing of
intercourse and also sued Malohoff for violating their privacy by making the
incident public. 131 The Stivers also unsuccessfully alleged that the handicap
was due to a virus carried by Malahoff's sperm.132
The surrogacy agreement should also address other miscellaneous
foreseeable consequences, including but not limited to the death of the
intended parent(s) or surrogate during the pregnancy or upon delivery,'3 an
129. Stiver v. Parker, 975 F.2d 261, 269 (6th Cir. 1992).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 264.
132. Id. at 263-64.
133. See, e.g., COLo. REv. STAT. § 19-4-106 (8) (2010) ("If a spouse dies before
placement of eggs, sperm, or embryos, the deceased spouse is not a parent of the resulting
child unless the deceased spouse consented in a record that if assisted reproduction were
to occur after death, the deceased spouse would be a parent of the child."); 2011 N.M.
Adv. Legis. Serv. 124 (addressing issues, including the death of an intended parent(s)
during the pregnancy); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158 (2011).
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embryo mix-up resulting from fertility center error, health complications of
the intended parent(s) or surrogate, the arrest, indictment or imprisonment of
the surrogate, her partner, or the intended parent(s), and the financial
instability of the intended parent(s).
In addition to foreseeable consequences, the surrogacy agreement should
contemplate changed conditions. As with pre-nuptial agreements, the
"changed conditions" provision may serve as a catch-all that will encompass
unanticipated contingencies. Perhaps as in the pre-nuptial context, the
parties may circumvent the contract's enforcement by arguing that
circumstances have changed so dramatically since they executed the
agreement that enforcing it under present circumstances would be
unconscionable.
8. Abortion
Although the United States Supreme Court has not squarely resolved the
issue, a surrogacy agreement that does not allow a traditional surrogate to
abort pursuant to Roe and its progeny is likely violative of the surrogate's
constitutional rights and as such, is unenforceable. For example, the
surrogacy contract at issue in Baby M did not permit the surrogate to abort
unless the physician deemed it necessary to protect the surrogate's physical
health or if the child is physiologically abnormal.134 If she refused to abort,
the intended father's obligations ceased, "except as to obligations of
paternity imposed by statute."l 35
A surrogacy agreement should envision the implications of abortion
whether as a result of fetal abnormalities or the surrogate's exercise of her
constitutional rights. Such a contract might permit the surrogate to abort the
fetus, as permissible under law, so long as she reimburses the intended
parent(s) for all fees provided to her until that time, unless the parties
mutually consent to the abortion because, for instance, the child suffers from
debilitating birth defects. However, the surrogate could be liable for
intentional infliction of emotional distress claims on the part of the intended
parent(s) if she chooses to abort, but a full discussion of the legal liability
arising from such an abortion exceeds the scope of this Article.
F. Void against Public Policy
Because a contract is unenforceable if it is void against public policy,
public policy concerns pose yet another challenge to the enforceability of
134. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1268 (N.J. 1988).
135. Id. (citing the surrogate parenting agreement).
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surrogacy contracts.136 Survey evidence regarding reproductive surrogacy
illuminates public sentiment regarding contractual regulation of the practice.
One poll revealed that seventy percent of Americans believe that the contract
at issue in Baby M should have been enforced.137 Less than twenty percent
of participants felt that Baby M should be left with her surrogate mother,
contract or no contract.' 38 The poll suggests that public opinion cut against
the court's refusal to enforce the surrogacy contract.
Reproductive surrogacy raises public policy concerns because it allegedly
disrupts family ties, offends ethical sensibilities, condones the treatment of
children as commodities, leads to the exploitation of women, and could
negatively impact affected parties, especially the child. Although little or no
empirical research regarding the long-term impact of reproductive surrogacy
on the intended child exists, it is reasonable to assume that the intended child
could feel rejected by her surrogate mother or suffer psychological effects,
which are not in her best interests. On the other hand, absent surrogacy, she
would not have existed, so perhaps her existence trumps the impact the
unique circumstances of her conception might cause. Furthermore,
terminating parental rights and relinquishing a child for adoption are
permissible even though relinquished children may experience feelings of
rejection and sometimes search for their biological parents.
In the absence of clear empirical proof regarding the impact of surrogacy,
one can only speculate as to whether the circumstances unique to
reproductive surrogacy, including the exchange of money, could increase or
decrease the psychological impact of reproductive surrogacy on the intended
child. On the other hand, perhaps a child's knowledge of his intended
parents' willingness to go to extremes and expend substantial financial
resources to bring him into existence might counter any feelings of rejection.
Although reproductive surrogacy is commonly criticized as perverting
traditional notions of "family" and disrupting family ties, which contravenes
public policy and is not in the child's best interests, at least some survey
evidence suggests otherwise. A 2004 study found that intended parents who
conceived via reproductive surrogacy experience greater psychological well-
being and adaptation to parenthood than counterparts who conceived
through natural, planned pregnancies.1 39 The study also found that intended
136. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1979).
137. FIELD, supra note 39.
138. Id.
139. S. Golombok et al., Families Created Through Surrogacy Arrangements Parent-
Child Relationships in the 1s' Year ofLife, 40 DEV. PSYCH. 400, 400-11 (2004). It should
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parents experienced lower levels of stress and showed greater warmth and
attachment to their infants in the first year of life. 14 0 Infant temperament did
not appear to significantly vary based on the manner of procreation, and
there was no difference in the level of parental expressed warmth or
emotional involvement according to the presence or absence of a genetic
link.141 Surrogacy arrangements in which a sibling or friend served as the
surrogate had more positive outcomes than ones involving strangers, which
could be the result of a reduction in the social stigma.142
The authors of the 2004 study discuss several explanations for their
findings. They suggest that parents who resort to reproductive surrogacy
have a greater desire to be parents, so it is unsurprising that they greatly
143invest in their children. The authors hypothesize that parents who
procreate via reproductive surrogacy may be less likely to have
psychological problems at the outset of the surrogacy process and are, thus,
less susceptible to stress.1 4 4 In addition, the older in age the mothers who
use surrogacy taken together with the smaller number of children in their
families may explain why they are typically more emotionalli involved with
their children than younger mothers who conceive naturally.
The potentially adverse impact of reproductive surrogacy on the intended
mother is another public policy concern, but little empirical research has
been done in this area. At least some evidence indicates that reproductive
surrogacy may psychologically strain the intended mother.146 As a result,
she may deliberately avoid bonding with the intended child due to the
uncertainty of the enforceability of the surrogacy contract; this errs in favor
of stronger contractual protections. 147  Especially when artificial
be noted, however, that the 2004 study examined parent-child relationships before the
manner of conception was revealed to the child. Id. at 408.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 408-09.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 408.
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insemination is used to impregnate a younger, fertile surrogate, an older,
infertile intended mother could experience jealousy, inadequacy, guilt, and
resentment, compromising her marriage and poisoning her relationship with
the surrogate or even the child. 148 Stigma, prejudice, and other expressions
of disap roval, especially from family and friends, could intensify such
feelings. To complicate matters, intended parents that utilize reproductive
surrogacy must explain the origin of their child to others, because unlike
other forms of assisted reproduction, which can be kept secret, the intended
mother is never visibly pregnant.'5 0 Taken together, parental depression,
low self-esteem, marital strain, and the lack of social or familial support
could taint the parent-child relationship.1
Furthermore, surrogacy may not be in the child's best interests because a
surrogacy broker may have little or no incentive or legal duty to find the
most suitable home for a child. Rather, an unscrupulous surrogacy broker
might place the baby in the hands of any person(s) who can pay his fees,
regardless of their suitability for childrearing. By contrast, an adoption
agency considers a plethora of factors and may perform home studies when
determining whether to place a child; this better protects the child's best
interests by ensuring that she goes to a suitable home. As such, absent
regulation, reproductive surrogacy may lack the safeguards that adoption
affords.
Requiring suitability determinations and mandatory home studies may
alleviate these concerns. Surrogacy should ideally be limited to "suitable"
individuals or couples as determined on a case-by-case basis via home
studies, psychiatric evaluations, and other pertinent criteria. While a variety
of factors may be considered when making this suitability determination, no
one factor should be dispositive. It is in everyone's best interests that the
parties to the surrogacy agreement be properly screened and deemed
suitable.
Aside from the child's best interests, the most obvious public policy
concern inherent in reproductive surrogacy is its potential negative impact
on the surrogate. Surrogacy agreements compel a surrogate to relinquish a
child that she has carried for nine long months. This leads to a separation of
the child from her gestational (and, in some cases, biological) mother absent
a showing of unfitness, intentional abandonment, or neglect. However, to
148. Id.
149. Id. at 401.
150. Golombok et al., supra note 139, at 401.
15 1. Id.
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say that a woman cannot contract to be a surrogate simply because surrogacy
can be psychologically and physically harmful to her is paternalistic. Should
the potential for later regrets by the surrogate be a valid reason to altogether
remove her right to choose? Such paternalistic reasoning could be employed
to oppose access to non-therapeutic abortions in contravention of Roe v.
Wade and its progeny or to prohibit gamete donation. Informed consent
presupposes that the woman will decide for herself whether she will perform
the contract. As explicated by Roe, the state should not remove her power of
choice based on paternalism just as it is not allowed to decide whether or not
she will able to withstand the emotional and psychological feelings that
result from having an abortion.
G. Additional Recommendations
Because a surrogacy contract involves such important subject matter and
may result in litigation, a surrogacy agreement should be memorialized in
writing signed by both parties. The writing may also serve as evidence in
subsequent litigation.
The surrogacy contract should also contain a merger clause to clarify that
the writing constitutes the entire agreement, which will prevent the use of
extrinsic evidence in interpreting the agreement if litigation ensues. 52 It
should also include a subsequent modification clause stating that subsequent
oral modifications will not modify the agreement unless they are in a writing
signed by the parties with their fully informed consent. This clause should
limit the authority to modify to the surrogate and the intended parent(s). In
addition, the contract should incorporate a severability clause to ensure that
even if one or more provisions of the contract are deemed unenforceable, the
other contractual provisions will remain in force.
IV. THE FUTURE OF REPRODUCTIVE SURROGACY
Although the future of reproductive surrogacy will not likely be as bleak
as Atwood imagines, the concerns that she raises will not soon disappear.
Women increasingly defer pregnancy until completion of their education and
career plans; their mature age often complicates procreation. As assisted
reproduction technologies advance and a growing number of women battle
such infertility, the waiting list for healthy infants will expand, leading more
couples to pursue reproductive surrogacy. As reproductive surrogacy
becomes more common, it may also become more affordable and less
stigmatized.
While the future of reproductive surrogacy remains unclear, its regulation,
contractual or otherwise, is a necessary evil and perhaps a societal good.
152. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 209-17 (1979).
312
2011 For Love or Money 313
Contractual regulation, however, is not enough. Although some legislators
have dismissed the need for uniform comprehensive surrogacy legislation
because they view surrogacy as a fringe issue, a pressing need for legal
clarification in the surrogacy arena exists to ensure that surrogacy contracts
do not contravene existing law and public policy. In the absence of
comprehensive surrogacy legislation, however, contractual regulation will at
least honor the parties' intent to the extent possible, giving them the freedom
and security to create life by unorthodox means. Perhaps that is all that the
contractual regulation of reproductive surrogacy is-an imperfect means to
miraculous births.
